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THE SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1977
I. INTRODUCTION
Along this nation's seashore lie some of our most scenic and
important natural resources: marshes, estuaries, sand dunes,
beaches, and ocean waters. In addition, one out of every two
persons lives within fifty miles of the coast.' Unfortunately, the
concentration of such large numbers of people in this relatively
small strip of land has severely strained the resources of the
coastal zone. Diking, dredging, and filling have already destroyed
hundreds of thousands of acres of salt marsh;2 pollution has con-
taminated most of the estuaries; 3 bulldozers have leveled miles of
sand dunes to make way for new housing and high-rise develop-
ments. As the number of coastal residents continues to increase,
4
the existence of those resources that remain is threatened.
In the 1960's the coastal states began to recognize the need
for governmental control over the disordered state of affairs in
their coastal zones. By 1972 every state on the Atlantic coast
except South Carolina had enacted legislation that established
authority over what is perhaps the most critical resource of the
coastal zone, the wetlands.5 In that same year Congress passed
1. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 4776, 4777. [Hereinafter cited S. REP. No. 753].
2. From 1922 to 1954, man destroyed over one-quarter of the country's salt marshes.
Id.
3. E.g., in South Carolina pollution has necessitated the closing of nearly one-third
of the state's 183,000 acres of oyster grounds. Letter from M.C. Moore, Public Information
Specialist, S.C. Water Resources Comm., to Brad W. Wyche (Dec. 3, 1976).
4. It is estimated that by the turn of the century 80% of the U.S. population will
reside within 50 miles of the coasts of the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes. S. REP.
No. 753, supra note 1, at 4777.
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-28 to -45 (West 1975); DEL. CODE tit. 7, §§ 7001-7013
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.01 to .11 (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. 88 45-136 to -147
(1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 471-478 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-101 to -501 (1974); MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 and ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:1 to: 5 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERv. LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0601 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (McKin-
ney); N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 113A-100 to -128 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to .20 (Cum.
Supp. 1977). These statutes generally define wetlands as those areas, subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, that hre capable of supporting certain species of vegetation.
Since 1972, the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board has administered a
permit program for all construction and excavation activities on lands below the mean
high-water mark of navigable waters. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-5-40, 49-1-10 (1976).
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the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) to encourage the
states, through the availability of federal grants, to extend this
authority throughout the entire range of their coastal zones.
In South Carolina, as elsewhere, the problems of the coastal
zone present some of the most difficult and important environ-
mental issues facing the State. In the midst of considerable pub-
lic attention, the South Carolina General Assembly labored in
vain for nearly a decade to enact a law that would enable the
State to resolve the conflicting demands being made upon South
Carolina's coastal resources. 7 In 1976 the House and Senate fi-
nally agreed on two bills, only to have the Governor veto both.,
In the 1977 session, however, the General Assembly passed and
sent to the Governor a bill acceptable to him, and the South
Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977 became law.9
This note summarizes and evaluates the major provisions of
the new Act, considers the law in light of the CZMA, explores
present and possible future federal-state relations in the area of
coastal zone management, considers the relationship of the pub-
lic trust doctrine to the Act, and examines two constitutional
issues that are likely to arise under the Act. Before proceeding to
these issues, a brief review of the events that led to the enactment
of South Carolina's new coastal zone law will be helpful.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Early Emphasis on Tidelands Legislation
Under the rule adopted and repeatedly affirmed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, the State is presumptively the
owner of all land between the mean low- and mean high-water
6. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. V 1975)), as amended by Coastal Zone Management
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013, (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§
1451, 1452-1464 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) [hereinafter cited as the CZMA with textual refer-
ences to Act sections].
7. See, e.g., S. 744, 98th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 221, 99th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess.
(1971); S. 977, 99th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 260, 101st Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1975);
H. 1045, 99th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1971); H. 1237, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973); H.
2012, 100th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1974); H. 2420, 101st Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1975). The bills
considered prior to 1973, however, dealt only with wetlands.
8. Veto Message of the Governor on H. 2420 (June 18, 1976) [1976] S.C. HousE J.
3344; Veto Message of the Governor on H. 2839 (July 1, 1976) [1976] S.C. HousE J. 3602.
9. Coastal Zone Management Act, No. 123, 1977 S.C. Acts 224 (codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-39-10 to -220 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
1978]
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marks, the tidelands.'" A private claimant to the tidelands can
rebut this presumption only by (1) producing an unbroken chain
of title back to an original grant from the sovereign (the Crown,
the Lords Proprietors, or the State) and (2) pointing out specific
language in the grant evincing an intent to convey to the mean
low-water mark." Because the claimants were unable to sustain
this heavy burden of proof, however, the State has prevailed in
all but one case.'"
While the presumption in favor of the State is a strong one,
it is nonetheless rebuttable; therefore, unless it obtains a judicial
determination, the State can never be completely certain whether
it owns a particular tract of tidelands. In the 1960's and early
1970's, several bills introduced in the legislature contained provi-
sions aimed at determining the extent of the State's title to the
tidelands. Some proposed bills would have created an adminis-
trative body to which individual claims of ownership of the tide-
lands could be presented and determined; others would have al-
lowed persons claiming ownership of tidelands formerly used for
rice cultivation to prove title thereto.'" A bill proposed by the
State attorney general would have required all claimants to file
notice of their intention to preserve their claims by a certain
date." All properties not claimed by that date would have vested
10. State v. Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78, 82, 216 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1976); State v.
Griffith, 265 S.C. 43, 46, 216 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1976); State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 539,
193 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1972); Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina
Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 434, 146 S.E. 434, 436 (1928); State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484,
507 (1884).
Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302, 1311-1315 (1970),
South Carolina is the absolute owner of all lands located between the mean low-water
mark and the state's jurisdictional limit-the so-called submerged lands. See generally
Wyche, The Law of Tidelands in South Carolina, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
SELECTED Topics 81, 86-94 (G. Poliakoff ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Wyche, The Law
of Tidelands]; Clineburg and Krahmer, The Law Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South
Carolina, 23 S.C.L. REv. 7 (1971).
11. It appears from the cases cited in note 10 supra that such an intent can be
demonstrated only if the original grant actually contains the words "to low-water mark."
Language in the grant describing the tract as bound by the Atlantic Ocean and certain
named streams consistently has been held insufficient to signify the requisite intent to
convey beyond the mean high-water mark.
12. Lane v. McEachern, 251 S.C. 272, 162 S.E.2d 174 (1968). The claimant succeeded
in Lane only because the entire tract in question was situated below the mean high-watbr
mark. The grant would therefore have conveyed nothing unless construed as passing title
to the low-water mark. Cf. Conch Creek Corp. v. Guess, 263 S.C. 211, 209 S.E.2d 560
(1974), modified, 265 S.C. 427, 219 S.E.2d 515 (1976).
13. S. 744, 98th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess., §§ 19-22 (1970); S. 221, 99th Gen. Ass., 1st
Sess., §§ 19-22 (1971).
14. S. 977, 99th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess., § 22 (1972).
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absolutely in the State; conflicting claims would have been re-
solved by litigation. 5
The General Assembly, however, enacted none of these pro-
posals, and by 1972 the principal concern of the legislature had
shifted from the narrow issue of ownership to the broader and
more important concept of coastal zone management.'5
B. Passage of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972
Congress enacted the CZMA "to preserve, protect, develop,
and where possible, to restore and enhance, the resources of the
Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations." 7 As
mentioned previously, the CZMA's basic thrust is to provide fi-
nancial incentives to the states to encourage them "to exercise
their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal
zone."' 8 Under section 305 any coastal state is eligible to receive
federal funds (up to eighty percent of costs) for the development
of a coastal zone management program. 9
After formulation of its program, the state can submit it to
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
for review under the criteria set forth in sections 305(b) and
306(c)-(e); the NOAA administers the CZMA under authority
15. S.C. WATER RESOURCES CouNcIL, S.C. TIDELANDS REPORT 25 (1970). While state
ownership certainly facilitates the protection of the tidelands, it is not essential for that
purpose. All tidelands owners, the state as well as private persons, are deemed to hold
their property in trust for public purposes. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d
374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Stone, Public Rights in Water -Uses and Private Rights in
Lands Adjacent to Water, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 177, 197 (R. Clark ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Stone, Public Rights]; Wyche, The Law of Tidelands, supra note
10, at 101-02.
16. Nonetheless, tidelands ownership remained a significant issue in the ensuing
legislative debate, particularly in the Governor's office. The Act contains a provision
allowing claimants to sue the State to establish title to the tidelands. See notes 122-27
and accompanying text infra.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (Supp. V 1975).
18. Id. § 1451(h). Unlike the federal air and water laws, the CZMA does not impose
sanctions on states that either elect not to prepare a management program or prepare
inadequate ones. The consequence of noncompliance is simply the loss of federal funds.
For detailed discussions of the CZMA, see Ludwigson, Coastal Zone Management: A
Whole New Ballgame, 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) No. 45 (Monograph 18); NATURAL RESOURcES
DEFENSE CoUNCiL, LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNTrE STATES, ch. 6 (1977); Zile, A
Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1 J. COASTAL
ZONE MGMT. 235 (1974); Symposium, Implementation of the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 717 (1975).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(c) (Supp. V 1975).
1978]
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delegated to it by the Secretary of Commerce." If the program is
approved by NOAA, the state becomes eligible under section 306
to receive grants to implement and administer its management
program.2' In addition, under the 1976 amendments to the
CZMA, 22 coastal states are eligible to receive federal grants to
study, plan for, and control the impact that outer continental
shelf development may have on their coastal zones.
23
In August 1973, Governor West accepted the challenge of the
CZMA and created the South Carolina Coastal Zone Manage-
ment and Planning Council, designating it the official State
agency to receive and utilize the federal funds available under
section 305.24 The Planning Council's main task was to develop a
comprehensive coastal zone management program that would
meet the requirements of the CZMA and enable the State to
receive funding under section 306. Obvious from the start, how-
ever, was NOAA's lack of authority to approve any South Caro-
lina program unless the State were given sufficient authority to
control land and water uses within its coastal zone.25 At that time,
the State, through its Budget and Control Board, exercised con-
trol in the coastal zone only over the tidelands and submerged
lands, an authority clearly too limited to meet the mandate of the
CZMA.2 1 The General Assembly thus set to work in 1973 to enact
a law giving the State broader control over the resources of its
coastal zone. The law did not emerge until four years later.
27
20. Id. §§ 1454(b), 1455(c)-(e). Guidelines adopted by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under the statute may be found at 15 C.F.R. § § 920-
928 (1976), modified, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,035 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 43,552 (1977).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. V 1975). The CZMA also provides for preliminary ap-
proval of a state's program that fails to meet the requirements of the CZMA provided the
state is working towards correcting such deficiencies. Id. § 1454(d).
22. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
23. Id. § 1456(a). In 1977 the S.C. General Assembly enacted a law regulating the
exploration, drilling, transportation, and production of oil and natural gas within the
jurisdictional limits of South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-10 to -850 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
24. South Carolina has already received and expended four grants, the maximum
number permitted under § 305.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of the Board's authority and
procedures, see Wyche, The Law of Tidelands, supra note 10, at 121-22.
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 to -220 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Ironically, the State's
authority under the Act is probably still insufficient to comply with the CZMA. See notes
51-63 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 29
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I. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. General Scheme
The Act establishes the South Carolina Coastal Council, an
administrative body composed of eighteen legislators and citi-
zens, and charges it with two basic duties: (1) to develop, admin-
ister, and enforce a State coastal zone management program and
(2) to exercise regulatory control over various activities within
certain areas of the coastal zone."8
B. Policy
The basic policy of the Act is "to protect the quality of the
coastal environment and to promote the economic and social
improvement of the coastal zone and of all the people of the
state. '29 With respect to the critical areas, the only coastal re-
sources over which the Council is given direct, permit-issuing
authority," the Act provides:
Critical areas shall be used to provide the combination of uses
which will insure the maximum benefit to the people, but not
necessarily a combination of uses which will generate measur-
able maximum dollar benefits. As such, the use of a critical
area for one or a combination of like uses to the exclusion of
some or all other uses shall be consistent with the purposes of
this chapter."
This provision reflects the General Assembly's recognition that
the environmental costs of altering or destroying a critical area
often will outweigh the more easily quantifiable economic bene-
fits of a particular project.32 Therefore, preservation of a critical
area to the exclusion of its development would be a use consistent
with the policy of the Act.
C. Composition of the Council
The new South Carolina Coastal Council consists of eighteen
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Act thus transfers the
State Budget and Control Board's regulatory authority over areas below the mean high-
water mark to the Council. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-210 (Cum.,Supp. 1977). The Board's
authority over activities in nontidal, navigable waters is not affected.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. See text accompanying notes 35-50 infra.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(D) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
32. See text accompanying notes 214-18 infra.
1978]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
members appointed as follows: (1) One member, named by the
local county governing body, from each of the eight coastal coun-
ties," (2) one member from each of the six congressional districts
in the State, elected by the State legislators representing the
counties in each district, (3) two State senators, and (4) two
members of the House of Representatives .
3
D. Scope of Authority
1. The Critical Area Concept.-The Act defines "coastal
zone" as all lands and waters in the eight coastal counties sea-
ward to the State's jurisdictional limit.35 The Act, however, gives
the Council direct regulatory authority only over the critical areas
of the coastal zone.3 1 "Critical area" is defined as any of the
following: (1) Coastal waters, (2) tidelands, (3) beaches, and (4)
primary oceanfront sand dunes. The definitions of these terms
determine the extent of the Council's permit-issuing jurisdiction
under the Act. Unfortunately, the meanings of the terms are not
entirely clear.
"Coastal waters" is defined as "the navigable waters of the
United States subject to the ebb and flood of the tide and which
are saline waters, [containing at least one part chloride ion per
thousand3 ] shoreward to their mean high-water mark. ' ' 39 Al-
though the Act fails to define navigable waters of the United
States, the legislature is presumably referring to the Army Corps
of Engineers' long-standing definition of the term as "those wa-
ters that are subject to the ebb and flood of the tide and/or are
presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be suscepti-
ble to use to transport interstate or foreign commerce."4 Under
this interpretation, the term "coastal waters" encompasses all
tide-influenced waters in the State that have the requisite degree
of salinity.
"Tidelands" is defined to include (1) all land below the mean
33. The counties are Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Horry,
Jasper, and Georgetown.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-40 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. Id. § 48-39-200.
37. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
38. Id. § 48-39-10(E).
39. Id. § 48-39-10(F).
40. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,161 (1977) (to be codified in 33 C.F.R. § 329.4). The Corps'
definition is based on the federal test of navigable waters established in The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
[Vol. 29
7
Wyche: The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977
Published by Scholar Commons, 1978
SOUTH CAROLINA CZMA
high-water mark and (2) those areas above the mean high-water
mark that are (a) contiguous or adjacent to coastal waters, (b) an
integral part of an estuarine system, (c) periodically inundated
by saline water, and (d) capable of supporting the growth and
reproduction of saline water vegetation. 41 Under a literal interpre-
tation of this definition, part (2) does not apply to lands below
the mean high-water mark. Consequently, all freshwater wet-
lands in the coastal zone that lie below this mark would be sub-
ject to the Council's authority under part (1). It is unlikely that
the General Assembly intended this result. The State Attorney
General's Office has opined that requirement (2)(b) applies to
lands below the mean high-water mark.42 Under this interpreta-
tion, which seems reasonable, only those freshwater and brackish
wetlands that are, in the Council's judgment, "an integral part
of an estuarine system"43 would be deemed critical areas.
"Beaches" is defined as "those lands subject to periodic in-
undation by tidal and wave action so that no nonlittoral vegeta-
tion is established." 4  This generally refers to the area lying be-
tween the mean high-water mark and the primary oceanfront
sand dunes. The latter is defined as "those dunes which consti-
tute the front row of dunes adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean."'4- In
its final rules and regulations promulgated under the Act," the
Council interprets this definition as excluding those primary
oceanfront sand dunes located more than 200 feet from the mean
high-water mark.47 In addition, the Council has limited its au-
thority "to the seaward side of any permanent man-made struc-
ture which was currently functional in its present form on Sep-
tember 28, 1977, where such structure is located seaward of any
primary dune and within 200 feet of mean high-water."4 Under
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(G) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
42. Opinion by Keith Babcock, Staff Attorney, S.C. Att'y Gen.'s Office to C. Clay-
mon Grimes, Jr., Member, S.C. Coastal Council (August 15, 1977).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(G) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
44. Id. § 48-39-10(H).
45. Id. § 48-39-10(I).
46. 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7, 14 (1978). Under § 12 the new Administrative Procedures
Act in South Carolina, these rules and regulations take effect ninety days after their
submission unless disapproved by the General Assembly. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120
(Cum. Supp. 1977). The Council's rules and regulations were finalized on June 7, 1978.
47. Rule 30-10(B)(2), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 36 (1978). Nearly all of these dunes
in South Carolina are located within 200 feet of the mean high-water mark. Telephone
interview with Ben Gregg, Staff Attorney, S.C. Coastal Council, Charleston, S.C. (Nov.
28, 1977).
48. Rule 30-10(B)(2)(3), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 37 (1978).
1978]
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this rule, those dunes situated behind existing structures located
within 200 feet of the mean high-water mark are not subject to
the Council's authority. Nothing in the Act, however, supports
the Council's conclusion that the General Assembly intended to
exempt from the regulatory program those primary dunes that
abut man-made structures. These "backyard sand dunes" are
exceedingly vulnerable to further alteration and thus demand the
Council's most stringent protection.
The Council has determined the approximate geographic
extent of its jurisdiction under the Act;49 the boundary line gen-
erally corresponds to that point in the coastal zone where vege-
tation changes from predominantly brackish to predominantly




2. Compliance with the CZMA.-The CZMA conditions
receipt of federal funds under section 306 on the existence of
regulatory authority in the coastal zone to control those land uses
that "have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters." 5'
Under the Act's definition of "critical area," however, many ac-
tivities conducted within the coastal zone, activities that directly
and significantly affect coastal waters, will not be subject to State
control." As long as the activity is located within an upland area,
the owner-operator will not be required to obtain a permit from
the Council. While NOAA affords the states great leeway in delin-
eating the scope of their authority in the coastal zone,53 the Coun-
cil's jurisdiction under the Act, standing alone, is likely to be
insufficient to meet the mandate of the CZMA.
54
49. Rule 30-10, id. at 34.
50. The northern half of South Carolina's shoreline is a much more stable geologic
area than the southern half. This accounts for the substantially smaller width of the
jurisdictional zone in the northern section.
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(a), 1454(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Eg., the construction of an industrial plant in Charleston. In the coastal zone bill
supported by environmentalists, H. 2473, 102d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1977), the Council's
authority would have extended to "uplands adjacent," defined as "those lands, activities
upon which would have a direct and significant effect on coastal waters, beaches, primary
oceanfront sand dunes and tidelands." Id. § 3 (G). Enactment of this bill would have given
the Council sufficient authority to satisfy CZMA stipulations. Of course, the Council
could exert indirect control over those operations that required the location of ancillary
facilities in critical areas.
53. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,563 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 923.31).
54. Telephone interview with Teresa Hooks, Staff Attorney, U.S. Office of Coastal
Zone Management, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 28, 1977).
As of April 1977 only three Pacific Coast states have coastal zone management pro-
grams approved by NOAA. While each state approached the problem differently, the
[Vol. 29
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Two alternatives are available to correct this deficiency. The
first is simply to amend the Act to extend the Council's authority
to those uplands adjacent to coastal waters. Although during its
1977 session the General Assembly indicated its dissatisfaction
with such a provision by rejecting the environmentalist bill,55
possible loss of federal funding could prompt a second look."
The second alternative, which the Council is currently pursu-
ing, is to rely on section 7(A) of the Act, which directs that "[a]ll
agencies currently exercising regulatory authority in the coastal
zone shall administer such authority in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter and rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder." 57 The Council interprets this provision as requiring
all State and local agencies to comply with the terms of the final
approved coastal zone management program."5 The principal
State agencies involved (including their main areas of jurisdic-
tion) are the State Budget and Control Board (nontidal, naviga-
ble waters), the Department of Health and Environmental Con-
trol (air and water pollution control), the State Department of
Highways and Public Transportation (roads and highways), the
Land Resources Conservation Commission (mining operations),
the Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (state parks),
the State Ports Authority (ports and harbors), the Water Re-
sources Commission (surface and groundwaters), and the De-
scope of authority in all three is much broader than that provided for in the Act. In
Washington, control extends to all the shorelines of the state and wetland areas (defined
as all land within 200 feet of the ordinary high-water mark on streams, lakes, and tidal
waters; floodways and floodplains, marshes, bogs and swamps associated with the shore-
lines). WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(B)(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See Crooks, The Wash-
ington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REv. 423,431-36 (1974). In Califor-
nia, the coastal zone generally extends inland 1,000 yards from the mean high-water mark;
however, in "significant coastal estuarine, habitat, and recreational areas it extends in-
land to the first major ridgeline" or five miles from the mean high-water mark, whichever
is less. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30103(a) (1976). The Oregon statute has been repealed. OR.
REV. STAT. § 191.110(4) (1974) (repealed 1977).
55. H. 2473, 102d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1977). See also note 52 supra.
56. The legislature might wish to consider the approach adopted in North Carolina
where regulatory authority extends throughout each of the twenty coastal counties. The
State exercises direct control over major developments and projects in areas of environ-
mental concern; local county governments, under land use plans approved by the state,
have jurisdiction over all other developments. See, Schoenbaum, The Management of
Land and Water Use in the Coastal Zone: A New Law Is Enacted in North Carolina, 53
N.C.L. REv. 275 (1974). The CZMA expressly authorizes this approach. 16 U.S.C. §
1455(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-70(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
58. Telephone interview with Ben Gregg, Staff Attorney, S.C. Coastal Council,
Charleston, S.C. (Nov. 28, 1977).
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partment of Wildlife and Marine Resources (fish, game, and rare
and endangered species). The Council is presently attempting to
enter into memoranda of understanding with these agencies,
under which the agencies agree to administer their programs in
accordance with the management program.
5 9
NOAA expressly endorses such a "networking" of authority
approach in the coastal zone." The regulations state that "the
effect of networking is to tie the implementation of these individ-
ual authorities into a comprehensive framework that addresses
more than the individual responsibilities of each agency and that
makes these authorities part of an overall, unified strategy for
managing coastal land and water resources."'" NOAA makes it
clear that each agency must be legally bound to exercise its au-
thority in conformity with the management program; otherwise,
the networking arrangement will not be acceptable under section
306.62 Whether the Council will be able to obtain such commit-
ments from all the various State agencies remains to be seen.
Even if such commitments were acquired, however, the lack of
direct regulatory control vested in the Council over uses in the
adjacent uplands still remains. Therefore there is no guarantee
that a networking arrangement would give the State sufficient
authority to satisfy the requirements of the CZMA.6
E. The Permit Program
1. Exemptions. -Section 13(C) provides that as of Septem-
ber 28, 1977, any person desiring to "fill, remove, dredge, drain
or erect any structure or in any way alter any critical area" first
must obtain a permit from the Council.64 This subsection, how-
ever, contains the following exemption:
Provided, however, that a person who has legally commenced a
use such as those evidenced by a state permit, as issued by the
59. The Council has finalized such agreements with the Department of Health and
Environmental Control, the Water Resources Commission, and the Department of Wild-
life and Marine Resources.
60. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,567 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 923.42(d)(3)).
61. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 923.42(d)(3)(iii)).
62. Id. at 43,567-68 (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 923.42(d)(4)).
63. The Council's authority is deficient under the CZMA in another aspect as well.
The Act does not give the Council the power "to acquire fee simple and less than fee simple
interests in lands, waters, and other property through condemnation or other means when
necessary to achieve conformance with the management program." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2)
(Supp. V 1975).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(C) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Budget and Control Board, or a project loan approved by the
rural electrification administration or a local building permit or
has received a United States Corps of Engineers or Coast Guard
permit, where applicable, may continue such use without ob-
taining a permit.65
The meaning of this proviso was at issue in South Carolina
State Ports Authority v. South Carolina Coastal Council,6 the
first case to arise under the Act. By September 16, 1977, the Ports
Authority had received from the Budget and Control Board all
necessary State permits for construction of the controversial
Wando River project at Charleston Harbor."7 The Council, how-
ever, subsequently notified the Ports Authority that these per-
mits would have to be reprocessed under the new coastal zone
law. The Ports Authority thereupon sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the proviso contained in section 13(C) exempted the
Wando River project from the Council's jurisdiction. The Council
maintained that the proviso applies only if two steps have been
accomplished on or before September 28, 1977: (1) the acquisition
of all necessary permits ["legally"] and (2) the actual undertak-
ing or performance of the activity ["commenced the use"]. Ac-
cordingly, the Council was entitled to assert jurisdiction over the
project since construction had not begun as of the above date.
The lower court rejected the Council's argument and held
that the project had been "legally commenced" within the mean-
ing of section 13(C). The supreme court affirmed, agreeing with
Judge Singletary's interpretation that "a state permit as issued
by the Budget and Control Board" (as well as any of the items
described in the proviso) constitutes not only evidence, but proof,
of a legally commenced use. 8 The court added that to allow the
Council to review all permits previously issued by the Budget and
Control Board "would be disruptive and prohibitively retroac-
tive."69 Thus, the Ports Authority is entitled to construct the
project without having to obtain a permit from the Council.
The Act also contains specific exemptions for the following
activities:7"
65. Id.
66. - S.C. -, 242 S.E.2d 225 (1978).
67. The Corps of Engineers issued a federal permit for the project on Dec. 27, 1977.
68. - S.C. at _, 242 S.E.2d at 227.
69. Id.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(D)(l)-(9) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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(1) Uses existing as of September 29, 1977;"
(2) accomplishment of emergency orders by government offi-
cials;
(3) hunting, fishing, trapping, conservation, research and rec-
reational activities, provided that such activities do not cause
"material harm" to the resources of the area;
(4) lawful discharges of treated effluent;"
(5) dredge and fill activities performed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers;73
(6) construction of walkways over sand dunes;
(7) emergency repairs to any existing lawfully authorized
structure;
(8) maintenance and repair of drainage, sewer, railroad, and
utility facilities;
(9) normal maintenance or repair to any pier or walkway, pro-
vided dredge or fill is not involved; and
(10) construction and maintenance of a major utility facility
which has obtained a certificate under state law.74
2. Procedure.-Each permit application must contain the
information set forth in section 14(B).11 Within thirty days prior
to application, the applicant must publish notice of his proposal
in both a newspaper of general circulation and in a newspaper of
the county in which the activity is proposed. Within thirty days
of receiving the application the Council must notify in writing all
interested parties of the proposed activity.76 These parties then
have thirty days in which to comment on the application if it is
71. Id. § 48-39-130(A). Of course, substantial modifications in existing uses would
require permits. Section 13(C) states that no person shall alter any critical area without
a permit. Id. § 48-39-130(C).
72, In June 1975 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authorized the
State of South Carolina, through the Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC), to administer the National Pollutant and Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) program established under § 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975). The Act prohibits the discharge
of any pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States unless a permit,
based at a minimum on applicable effluent limitations established by EPA, has been
obtained. EPA retains authority to veto any NPDES permit issued by DHEC, id. §
1342(d)(2), or, after public hearing, to withdraw approval of the state permit program,
id. § 1342(c)(3).
73. See text accompanying notes 140-56 infra.
74. These certificates must be obtained from the South Carolina Public Service Com-
mission pursuant to the Utility Facility Siting and Environmental Protection Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 58-33-10 to -430 (1976).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-140(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Rule 30-2-B(1)-(6), 2 S.C.
State Reg. No. 7 at 22-23.
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-140(C) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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deemed necessary." Upon the request of at least twenty residents
of the affected county or counties the Council is required to hold
a hearing."
The Council must act on a permit application within ninety
days of its receipt. 9 It may grant or deny the permit or issue a
permit conditioned on the applicant's taking specific measures
"necessary to protect the public interest."8 Reasons for denying
a permit application must be stated. Any person whose applica-
tion is denied or any person "adversely affected" by the issuance
of a permit has a right of direct appeal to the Council.8" The
Council's decision is then subject to judicial review. 3
3. Review and Evaluation.-In determining whether to
approve or deny a permit, the Council must examine a number
of factors set forth in section 15(A) of the Act. 4 The Act does not
require the Council to make specific findings but only to consider
"the extent to which" the proposed activity (1) requires a water-
front location or is economically enhanced by its proximity to
water, (2) would harmfully obstruct the natural flow of navigable
water, (3) would affect marine life, wildlife, and other natural
resources, (4) could cause erosion, shoaling of channels, or crea-
tion of stagnant water, (5) could affect public access to coastal
resources, (6) could affect habitats for rare and endangered spe-
cies of wildlife85 or irreplaceable historic and archeological sites,
and (7) could affect the value of adjoining property. In addition,
the Council is required to compare the economic benefits of the
proposed activity with the benefits of preserving the critical
77. Id. Time limitations are shorter for permit applications for minor developments,
e.g., the construction, maintenance, repair, or alteration of private piers and erosion
control structures not involving dredging activities. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(N) (Cum.
Supp. 1977). Rule 30-2(G), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 25 (1978).
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
79. Id. § 48-39-150(C).
80. Id. § 48-39-150(B).
81. Id. § 48-39-150(C).
82. Id. § 48-39-150(D). The appeal must be in writing and filed with the Council
within fifteen days of the final permit decision. Rule 30-6(A), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at
30 (1978).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-180 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
84. Id. § 48-39-150(A).
85. Under the S.C. Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act, S.C. CoDE
ANN. §§ 50-15-10 to -90 (1976), the Wildlife and Marine Resources Commission has the
authority to issue regulations and develop management programs for protecting nongame
and endangered species of wildlife in South Carolina. Several of the endangered species
in South Carolina are indigenous to coastal lands or waters, e.g., the eastern brown
pelican, sperm whale, and Atlantic leatherback turtle.
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area.86 In conducting this comparison, the Council, must be
mindful of the policy directive in section 2(D). 1 After completing
this evaluation and cqnsidering the views of all interested parties,
the Council may issue the permit upon finding that the planned
activity does not contravene the policies specified in the Act.u
F. Judicial Review
The circuit court of the county in which the affected area is
located has jurisdiction to restrain any violation of the Act. 9 The
Council, the attorney general, and any person "adversely af-
fected" all have standing to institute suits."' The court may order
a violator of the Act to restore a critical area to its original condi-
tion, "if possible, and environmentally desirable."9' The court
may also require a person seeking to restrain a violation of the Act
to post a reasonable bond.2
The Act gives the courts a sweeping scope of judicial review.
The court is authorized to review the Council's action de novo and
may even issue a permit itself if the applicant proves "the reasons
given for denial to be invalid."93 In South Carolina, as in most
jurisdictions, however, courts have exercised restraint in review-
ing the actions of administrative agencies notwithstanding the
legislature's authorization of an expansive scope of review."4
In Board of Bank Control v. Thomason,5 for example, re-
spondents sought to reverse the Bank Control Board's decision
denying them a license to conduct a small-loan business. The
applicable statute gave the courts the power "to affirm, modify,
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
87. Id. § 48-39.30(A). See text accompanying note 29 supra.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
89. Id. § 48-39-160.
90. Id. Under § 18, codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-180, any applicant whose
permit application has been denied, revoked, suspended, or approved may petition for
review of the Council's action within twenty days after receiving notice thereof. Under
the liberal law of standing in environmental litigation, the phrase "adversely affected"
should be construed to allow any South Carolina citizen who uses the state's coastal
resources, whether commercially or recreationally, to seek judicial review of the Council's
action. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-160 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 48-39-180.
94. See, e.g., State Bd. of Medical Registration v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 46 N.E.2d
602 (1943); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Or. 523, 336 P.2d 884 (1959); In re
Harmon, 52 Wash. 118, 323 P.2d 653 (1958). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINisTRATIvE LAw
TExT § 29.09 (3d ed. 1972).
95. 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960).
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or set aside" any order or decision of the Board." Relying on this
authority, the circuit court directed that respondents be issued a
license. The supreme court reversed, finding that it did not have
the power to substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Justice
Oxner, speaking for the majority stated:
In order not to offend the constitutional requirement as to sepa-
ration of powers, statutes undertaking to give the courts de novo
review of orders of administrative bodies exercising non-judicial
functions are generally construed as providing for only a limited
review.
It is our view that the function vested by the Act in the
State Board of Bank Control of determining whether a license
should be issued to an applicant is non-judicial in nature 7
The court held that its only obligation was to ensure that the
Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence;98 finding
the support present, it reinstated the agency's order.
Clearly the Council performs a function much like that of the
Bank Board in Thomason. In reviewing permit applications, it
must consider the host of factors set out in section 15(B) in light
of the policies specified in the Act. No two applications will be
exactly the same, and the Council necessarily must exercise dis-
cretion in reaching a decision. Its role is clearly ministerial and
nonjudicial in nature. Allowing a court to wipe the slate clean and
review the Council's action de novo would frustrate, if not defeat,
the administrative process established for protecting the State's
critical areas. As the Maryland Court of Appeals explained:
In this connection, we cannot refrain from observing that a prac-
tice which would permit judges or jurors to substitute, on a de
novo basis, their discretion for that of the department's experts,
would place this State in the intolerable situation of having as
many wetland decision-makers as there are circuit court judges
96. Id. at 164, 113 S.E.2d at 547.
97. Id. at 165-66, 113 S.E.2d at 547 (citations omitted). The traditional doctrine
requiring de novo review in cases where a violation of certain constitutional rights is
claimed, e.g., a taking of property without compensation, is today rejected by all federal
courts and by most state courts. See K. DAVIs, supra note 94, at § 29.08.
98. The generally accepted definition of substantial evidence is "such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolida-
tion Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Edwards v. Celebreeze, 220 F. Supp.
79, 81 (W.D.S.C. 1963).
99. 236 S.C. at 166, 113 S.E.2d at 547. See also Carolina Pipeline Co. v. South
Carolina Public Service Comm'n, 255 S.C. 325, 331, 178 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1971).
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and juries empaneled for this purpose. If this were to be the case,
the result would be a destruction of the effectiveness of the
department wetlands of this State, and reduce this agency's
power, in this field, as a practical matter, to a nullity.'
The South Carolina courts should therefore construe section 18
of the Act as providing for review of the Council's action only
under the test prescribed in the State Administrative Procedures
Act: "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable probative and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record."
1°1
G. The Coastal Zone Management Program
The Act requires that the Council develop and propose a
comprehensive management program for South Carolina's
coastal zone,'02 to take effect upon approval by the Governor and
the General Assembly.' 3 In developing this program the Council
must hold public hearings' 4 and cooperate with affected local
governments in the coastal zone.' 5 To insure compliance with the
CZMA, the Act requires that the program include the following
key elements: (1) Establishment of "a regulatory system which
the Council shall use in providing for the orderly and beneficial
use of the critical areas,"'06 (2) a determination of the present and
potential uses, and conflicts in the uses, of each coastal re-
100. Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md.
211, 228-29, 334 A.2d 514, 525 (1975). In this case the Maryland Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional the statutory provision of a wetlands law which authorized a de novo trial
on appeal from the department's decision on a permit application.
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The reviewing court would
find itself in a precarious position where the Council had not deemed a hearing necessary
under § 48-39-140(C) and consequently there was no record on the application. In such
cases, the appropriate step for the court would not be to undertake a trial de novo, but
rather to remand the case to the Council to hold a hearing and develop the necessary
record pursuant to the APA. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-320 to -350 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80 (Cum. Supp. 1977). However, unless the Council
achieves broader authority in the coastal zone either through legislation or by networking
a state authority, it would be more accurate to call it a "critical area management pro-
gram."
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-90(D) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Act sets no time limit
for the submission of this program. The Council expects to have a draft prepared by
September 1978. Telephone interview with Ben Gregg, Staff Attorney, S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, Charleston, S.C. (Nov. 28, 1977).
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-90 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
105. Id. § 48-39-100. Any city or county may submit to the Council regulations,
ordinances, or codes that apply to the critical areas. Upon review and approval by the
Council, these controls may be incorporated into the management program. Id. § 48-39-
100(B).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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source,' 7 (3) an inventory of areas of "critical state concern"
within the coastal zone,' 8 (4) establishment of "broad guidelines
on priority of uses in critical areas,"'09 and (5) an "adequate con-
sideration of the local, regional, state and national interest", in-
volved in the siting of energy and public service facilities
"necessary to meet requirements which are other than local in
nature.""'  In order to obtain federal approval, however, the
Council should include in the program several additional ele-
ments that are not specifically mentioned in the Act: (1) "a
method of assuring that local land and water use regulations
within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude
land and water uses of regional benefit," (2) a planning process
for protecting public beaches and other important public areas
and access thereto, and (3) a planning process for energy facili-
ties."'
H. Accreted Property
Under the common law, where the shoreline changes grad-
ually and imperceptibly through accretion, reliction, or erosion,"
2
the boundary line is extended or restricted in the same manner.,
The riparian owner thereby acquires title to all additions caused
107. Id. § 48-39-80(B)(3).
108. Id. § 48-39-80(B)(4). See 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975). The Council
has already completed such an inventory. Draft Report on Geographic Areas of Particular
Concern in the South Carolina Coastal Zone, Office of Coastal Planning, S.C. Coastal
Council (Oct. 1977).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (b)(5)
(Supp. V 1975).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-80(B)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8)
(Supp. V 1975).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(b)(7)-(8) (Cum.
Supp. 1977).
112. "Accretions" or "accreted lands" consist of additions to land from the gradual
and imperceptible deposit by water of sand, sediment or other material. "Reliction" refers
to land which formerly was covered by water, but which has become dry land by the
imperceptible recession of the water. "Erosion" is the gradual and imperceptible wearing
away of land bordering on a body of water by the natural action of the elements. Maloney
& Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal
Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REv. 185, 225 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Maloney
& Ausness, Coastal Boundaries].
113. Intendant and Wardens v. Charleston and W. Carolina Ry., 136 S.C. 525, 134
S.E. 497 (1926); Spigener v. Cooper, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 103 (1855). See Leavell, Legal
Aspects of Ownership and Use of Estuarine Areas in Georgia and South Carolina, Institute
of Government, The Univ. of Ga., 67-68 (1971).
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by accretion or reliction and loses soil that is worn away by ero-
sion.114
An important provision of section 12(B) alters the South Car-
olina rule, but the extent of the change is unclear. Those who
revel in statutory interpretation are invited to consider the mean-
ing of this provision:
Provided, further, that no person or governmental agency may
develop ocean front property accreted by natural forces or as the
result of permitted or nonpermitted structures beyond the mean
high-water mark as it existed at the time the ocean front prop-
erty was initially developed or subdivided, and such property
shall remain the property of the State held in trust for the peo-
ple of the State."15
Whether this provision passes all accreted lands to the State or
only those resulting from development or subdividing is unclear.
The constitutionality of the provision may depend upon the
construction adopted."' The provision is probably unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it purports to change existing law and
pass to the State lands that accreted prior to passage of the Act.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has invalidated the retroac-
tive application of laws which deprive persons of vested interests
in property."7 The provision might withstand constitutional at-
tack, however, if it means that the State acquires title only to
those lands that accrete after enactment of the law."'
Clearly, the above statutory provision is valid to the extent
that only lands accreted as a result of development or subdivision
pass to the State. As a general rule the riparian does not acquire
title to accreted lands caused by artificial conditions for which he
114. Maloney & Ausness, Coastal Boundaries, supra note 112, at 226.
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120(B)(Cum. Supp. 1977).
116. See McKinney v. City of Greenville, 262 S.C. 227, 242, 203 S.E.2d 680, 687-88
(1974) ("It is well-settled by the decisions in this State that a statute will, if possible, be
construed so as to render it valid, and courts should not declare a legislative enactment
unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable
doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution.")
117. See Dunham v. Davis, 229 S.C. 29, 35, 91 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1956); First Presby-
terian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S.C. 410, 423, 27 S.E.2d 573, 579 (1943).
See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) ("For a State cannot be
permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due
process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken
never existed at all.") (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967). See Maloney & Ausness,
Coastal Boundaries, supra note 112, at 227-37.
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is directly responsible."' While the final answer must await judi-
cial consideration, to insure its constitutionality the courts will
probably construe the provision prospectively.
By virtue of its jurisdiction over beaches, the Council now
exercises regulatory control over uses of accreted lands. Conse-
quently, even if the State does not succeed in obtaining title to
these lands, an adequate degree of protection can probably be
achieved through the permit program.
I. Erosion Control
The Act directs the Council to develop and institute a com-
prehensive beach erosion control policy.' 2 To this end, the Coun-
cil may issue permits for erosion control and water drainage struc-
tures in or upon lands below the mean high-water mark; these
structures must, however, promote the public health, safety, and
welfare and ensure continued use of these lands for public pur-
poses. 121
J. The Tidelands Ownership Dispute Revisited
A principal reason for the Governor's veto of the 1976 coastal
zone bills was the lack of a provision aimed at protecting the
rights of private claimants to the tidelands.1 2  Accordingly, the
General Assembly included section 22123 in the 1977 Act in an
effort to accommodate the Governor's objections.
119. See Annot., 134 A.L.R. 467, 472 (1941). On the other hand, where the artificial
condition is not within the control of the riparian, the great majority of courts award him
the accreted lands. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.2d 209, 211-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The
California. courts take the opposite position holding that accretions caused by an artificial
condition do not vest in the riparian, whether or not he is responsible for the condition.
See, e.g., People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 837, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 343 (1960).
Arguably, the Act ascribes to the California position since there is no mention of causation
in § 12(B). The State could argue that it acquires all lands that have accreted as a result
of development or subdividing, even though the owner on whose property the accretion
happens to occur is not responsible therefore. Cf. Epps v. Freeman, 261 S.C. 375, 386, 200
S.E.2d 235, 241 (1973) (the court recognized that the law of accretion does not apply where
the riparian fills in land under water to create new land).
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-120(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
121. Id. § 48-39-120(F).
122. In his veto message on H. 2420, Governor Edwards declared: "The crucial ques-
tion in this entire matter is not addressed by this legislation; that is, the establishment
of means of validation of ownership of these properties." Veto Message of the Governor
on H. 2420 (June 18, 1976), [1976] S.C. HOUSE J. 3344-45.
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-220 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Under this section, any claimant may bring suit against the
State to establish an interest in or title to a tract of tidelands.' 4
But there is nothing in section 22 or in the Act that alters or in
any way affects the rule that the State is presumptively the owner
of all lands below the mean high-water mark. ' Therefore, a sec-
tion 22 claimant will be required to trace an unbroken chain of
title back to the sovereign and to point out specific language in
the original grant evincing an intent to convey to the mean low-
water mark. Although section 22(B) authorizes trial by jury,'28 in
the great majority of cases the claimant, as a matter of law, will
be unable to prove these two elements.
While section 22 may lead to a considerable increase in the
number of tidelands ownership cases, the State's title to the tide-
lands will probably remain secure. In any event, under the public
trust doctrine it is immaterial who holds the legal title to tide-
lands for the law imposes on every owner, whoever it may be, the
same obligation: to hold the property in trust for the public bene-
fit.' 27
IV. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE COASTAL ZONE
A. Federal Consistency Provisions
A second major reason for the veto of the 1976 bills was the
Governor's feeling that the legislation represented "a major step
toward putting the federal government into regional land-use
control of private property."'28 This objection is unsound because
it overlooks two basic facts: (1) federal authority in the coastal
zone will remain whether or not a state law is enacted, and (2)
the federal consistency provisions of section 307 of the CZMA'2'
124. Id. § 48-39-220(A). For purposes of § 22, "tidelands" is defined as all lands
(except beaches) that are in the eight coastal counties and that lie "between the mean
high-water mark and the mean low-water mark of navigable waters, without regard to the
salinity of such waters." Id. Although the Act does not define "navigable waters," the
General Assembly probably intended to encompass within this definition the entire area
between the mean high- and mean low-water marks in the coastal counties. Under a literal
reading of "navigable waters," however, some portion of the state's tidelands might fall
outside the scope of § 22. Note that the exclusion of salinity in the definition of tidelands
makes it possible for claimants to non-tidal areas to utilize § 22.
125. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-190 to -220(C) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
126. Id. § 48-39-220(B).
127. See note 15 supra.
128. Veto Message of the Governor on H. 2829 (July 1, 1976), [1976] S.C. HousE J.
3603.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (Supp. V 1975). NOAA's regulations under § 307 are found at
42 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (1977) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 930).
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permit states with approved management programs to
"substantially influence federal policies and programs that affect
their coastal areas.'
130
Following NOAA's approval of a state management pro-
gram, 131 five provisions of section 307 come into force. First, fed-
eral agencies "conducting or supporting" activities that directly
affect the state's coastal zone must, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, conduct or support those activities in a manner consis-
tent with the state's program. 31 Second, federal development pro-
jects in the coastal zone must be consistent with the state's pro-
gram.1 3 Third, federal licenses or permits for activities in the
coastal zone may not be issued unless the state concurs in the
applicant's certification that the proposed activity complies with
the program. 134 Fourth, federal licenses or permits for activities
described in a plan for exploration, development, or production
from any area leased under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act 35 may not be granted unless the state concurs in the appli-
cant's blanket certification that all activities will be conducted
in compliance with the program.' Last, state and local govern-
ment applicants for federal grants must show that the proposed
projects are consistent with the program. 3 1
Several limitations are, however, placed on the consistency
provisions of section 307.135 The most important of these is the
power given to the Secretary of Commerce under section 307 (c)
to override a state's denial of certification if he finds that the
activity is either consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or
otherwise necessary in the interest of national security. 39
130. Blumm & Noble, The Promise of Federal Consistency Under § 307 of the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 6 E.L.R. 50,047, 50,065 (1976).
131. Section 307 has no application until the state's program receives federal ap-
proval. During development of the program, the state must afford all "relevant Federal
agencies. . . the opportunity of full participation." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
133. Id. § 1456(c)(2).
134. Id. § 1456(c)(3).
135. 43 U.S.C. 99 1331-1337, 1340-1343 (1970).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
137. Id. § 1456(d).
138. Id. § 1453(a) (exempting certain federal lands); id. § 1456(f) (subordinating state
program to requirements of federal air and water laws); id. § 1456(g) (subordinating state
program to future federal land use legislation).
139. Id. § 1456(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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B. The Corps of Engineers' Regulatory Programs
Undoubtedly the most pervasive federal presence in the
coastal zone is that of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps),
which administers the federal permit program for activities in
navigable waters. 4 ' The Corps' jurisdiction emanates from two
federal statutes, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899141 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 (FWPCAA).4  Under the former, " the Corps exercises
jurisdiction over all activities in "navigable waters of the United
States"; under the latter,' the Corps has authority over the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters," defined
as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.' 4 5
The Corps initially sought to limit its section 404 program to
the same waters covered under the 1899 Act.46 But in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, a federal district court
ordered the Corps to revise its regulations in accordance with the
intent of Congress, as manifested in the definition of "navigable
waters," to assert federal jurisdiction over "the nation's waters to
the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution."'' 4 The Corps subsequently issued its final regu-
lations under section 404 and extended the agency's jurisdiction
well beyond its traditional bounds.' The Corps now exercises
authority over dredge and fill activities not only in all areas below
the mean high-water mark but in all lakes of ten acres or more
and streams with flows of five cubic feet per second of more and
140. See generally Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. Rv. 503 (1977).
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-465 (1970).
142. Id. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
143. The Corps' authority under § 13, known as the Refuse Act, to regulate the
discharge of non-municipal pollutants was transferred to EPA by the FWPCAA. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342, 1345 (Supp. V 1975).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1975).
145. Id. § 1362(7) (Supp. V. 1975).
146. 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (1974).
147. 392 F. Supp. at 686 (D.D.C. 1975). Accord, State of Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543
F.2d 1198, 1200 & n. 1 (8th Cir. 1976); Weiszmann v. Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976); Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977). See generally,
Comment, Federal Control Over Wetland Areas: The Corps of Engineers Expands Its
Jurisdiction, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 787 (1976).
148. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (1977) (to be codified in 33 C.F.R., part 323).
"Wetlands" is defined as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in satu-
rated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1977).
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their adjacent wetlands. The Corps' jurisdiction extends into
areas far beyond the current authority of the Council. Similarly,
the latter's authority reaches into certain areas, such as beaches
and sand dunes, over which the Corps has no control. Obviously,
in many cases state and federal authority in the coastal zone
overlaps. 149
In case of overlap, the Corps will give great weight to a state's
decision, whether or not that state has an approved coastal zone
management program. When the state has denied a permit, the
Corps will do likewise.'50 When the state has issued a permit, the
Corps will issue its permit provided (1) the Secretary of Com-
merce has not vetoed the state's action, (2) "overriding national
factors of the public interest" do not dictate otherwise,' 5' and (3)
the state has considered the concerns, policies, goals, and require-
ments of the Corps' regulations and of a number of federal envi-
ronmental laws.'
52
Since wetlands that are subject to the Corps' jurisdiction
include tidelands subject to the Council's authority, the concerns
and policies of the Corps with respect to the wetlands should be
examined. Specifically noting their important natural functions,
the Corps states that "[w]etlands are vital areas that constitute
a productive and valuable public resource, the unnecessary alter-
ation or destruction of which should be discouraged as contrary
to the public interest." ' A permit for activities in these areas will
be issued only if "the benefits of the proposed alteration outweigh
the damage to the wetlands resource and the proposed alteration
149. Under the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (amending
33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975)), the Corps' authority over dredge and fill activities
in waters other than those meeting the traditional test of navigability, and their adjacent
wetlands, can be transferred to states that submit proposed permit programs that are
approved by EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(i) (1977). This delegation is possible, however,
only if the state also has authority over the waters involved. Id. § 1344(g)(1). Thus, the
Council at present could succeed only to the powers the Corps exercises over nonnavigable
coastal waters and the tidelands adjacent thereto.
150. If the state is operating under an approved coastal zone management program,
a permit application will not be considered unless the applicant has certified that his
activity complies with the program and the state has concurred in the certification or
waived its right to do so. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(h), 325.2(b)(2) (1977).
Certification from the appropriate state water pollution control authority that the
proposed activity would not contravene applicable effluent limitations and water quality
standards must be obtained before the Corps will consider a permit application.
151. 33 C.F.R. § 320.46)(4) (1977).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 320.4(b)(1).
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is necessary to realize those benefits." '54 In making this balance,
the District Engineer "shall consider whether the proposed activ-
ity is primarily dependent on being located, in or in close proxim-
ity to, the aquatic environment and whether feasible alternative
sites are available. ' 55
Recent action by the Corps indicates these policies are to be
interpreted strictly. In denying permits to fill 2,000 acres of man-
grove swamps on Marco Island, Florida, the Chief of Engineers,
Lieutenant General Gribble, held that the intent of the Corps'
wetland policy is to "protect valuable wetland resources from
unnecessary dredging and filling alteration to fulfill a purpose for
which, in most cases, other alternative sites exist. . ... "Is Al-
though the State had authorized the project, General Gribble, in
denying the request for a federal permit, relied on that provision
of the regulations permitting the Corps to reverse a state decision
when "overriding national factors of the public interest" so dic-
tate.
V. THREE IMPORTANT DOCTRINES
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
A possible challenge to the new act may be based on article
I, section 8 of the South Carolina Constitution, which requires
that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers be kept sepa-
rate and distinct. The challenger would invoke the nondelegation
doctrine and contend that in conferring on the Council the power
to control the use of the State's critical areas, the General Assem-
bly unconstitutionally delegated its legislative powers to an ad-
ministrative agency. 5 '
An examination of the relevant case law in South Carolina
indicates that a challenge on this ground would stand very little
154. Id. § 320.4(b)(4).
155. Id, The Council's final regulations under the Act implement a similar policy.
The Council will permit dredging and filling for public projects in tideland areas "only if
that activity is water-dependent and there are no feasible alternatives." Rule 30-
1lG(2)(b), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 46 (1978).
156. Report on Application for Department of the Army Permit to Dredge and Fill
at Marco Island, Florida, 6 E.L.R. 30,020 (Chief of Engineers, April 15, 1976). The Devel-
opers have filed suit against the Corps to compel issuance of the permits. Deltona Corp.
v. Alexander, No. 76-473-CN-J-C (M.D. Fla., filed July 7, 1976).
157. See generally, I. CoOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 3 (1965). See also Gold
v. S.C. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, - S.C. -, 245 S.E.2d 117 (1978).
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chance of success. Utilizing the traditional standards test,'58 the
South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld sweeping grants of
authority to various state agencies. The standards approved by
the court in the past have included: "as the board may in its
discretion, deem best for the interests of the State,"'59 "any mat-
ter declared by the Director of the prison system to be contra-
band,"" ' and "public convenience and necessity."' 6' These cases
typify the vast majority of decisions in which the court has re-
jected challenges based on the nondelegation doctrine."2
As discussed previously, the standard provided in the Act is
that "if the Council finds that the application is not contrary to
the policies specified in this chapter, it shall issue to the appli-
cant a permit."'63 In addition, the Council is to be guided by the
ten general considerations set forth in section 15(A).' 64 These
standards certainly are no less exacting than those sustained by
the court in most of its decisions.
Moreover, a court will examine the nature of the particular
circumstances in determining whether the standards are ade-
quate.6 5 For example, in zoning cases, most courts have perceived
158. This test has been described as follows:
[1]t is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary
standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the
administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protec-
tion of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of
the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise,
both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration.
South Carolina Highway Dept' v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 594, 86 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1955)
(quoting State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A. d 586, 588 (1940)).
159. State ex rel. Port Royal Mining Co. v. Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 523-24, 9 S.E. 686,
688 (1888).
160. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 263, 125 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 372 U.S. 521 (1963).
161. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 245 S.C.
229, 235, 139 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1965).
162. E.g., State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951); Davis v.
Query, 209 S.C. 41, 39 S.E.2d 117 (1946); Banks v. Batesburg Hauling Co., 202 S.C. 273,
24 S.E.2d 496 (1943); Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, 191 S.C. 271, 2 S.E.2d 36 (1939); State v.
Ross, 185 S.C. 472, 194 S.E. 439 (1937).
One notable exception is South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86
S.E.2d 466 (1955), where the court struck down a statutory provision authorizing the
highway department to suspend or revoke a driver's license "for cause satisfactory" to it
as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It is very difficult to reconcile this
case with the decisions discussed in the text, and the court has never attempted to do so.
See also Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 555, 88 S.E.2d 683, 691 (1955).
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-150(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
164. Id. § 48-39-150(A).
165. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 265, 125 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1962).
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the difficulty of devising meaningful standards and thus have
upheld the delegation of broad discretionary powers to zoning
boards. 6' As Qne court observed: "It would have been difficult, if
not impossible, to specify in what circumstances permits should
be granted and in what circumstances denied. That would de-
pend on numerous unforeseeable factors.' ' 7
This observation is particularly relevant to the Council's
permit-issuing authority over the State's critical areas. Only gen-
eral standards are possible in a regulatory milieu in which the
circumstances of each permit application will always vary. This
principle was recognized in three recent decisions in which state
critical area legislation was upheld against attacks based on the
nondelegation doctrine.' 8 If the Act is challenged on this ground,
it can be expected the South Carolina courts will reach the same
result.
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is rooted in the Roman law concept
of res communes and provides that because certain lands are so
intrinsically important to society, the owner of these lands is
deemed to hold his property in trust for public purposes." 9 As the
courts are apt to describe it, the owner's legal title, the jus
privatum, is subject to certain paramount rights of the public, the
jus publicum. Under the modern view, the jus publicum is not
limited to traditional navigation and fishing activities, but also
166. I. COOPER, supra note 157, at 62-67.
167. Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, 333 Mass. 114, 118, 128 N.E.2d 772,
775 (1955).
168. Ceeed v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,
118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974); Toms River Affiliates v. Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, 140 N.J. Super. 135, 355 A.2d 679 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364
A.2d 1077 (1976); J. M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 116 R.I. 54, 352 A.2d 661 (1976). See
generally Glenn, The Coastal Area Management Act in the Courts: A Preliminary
Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REV. 303, 314-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Glenn, Coastal Area
Management Plan]; Schoenbaum & Silliman, Coastal Planning: The Designation and
Management of Areas of Critical Environmental Concern, 13 URB. L. ANN. 15, 28-30
(1977).
169. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Rav. 471, 485-91 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine]. See also, Smith and Sammons, Public Rights in Georgia's Tidelands, 9
GA. L. REv. 79 (1974); Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1972); Wyche, The Law of Tidelands, supra note 10, at 95-116; Note, State
and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just Compensation, 58
VA. L. Ray. 876, 894-905 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, State and Local Wetlands
Regulations]; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Tradi-
tional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
[Vol. 29
27
Wyche: The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977
Published by Scholar Commons, 1978
1978] SOUTH CAROLINA CZMA
extends to recreation,7 0 protection of environmental quality,,'
and preservation of property in its natural state.' 2 Courts have
enjoined uses of public trust property that are in derogation of
these uses.
7 1
On several occasions the South Carolina Supreme Court has
announced that lands below the mean high-water mark in this
State are held in trust for public purposes. 74 It follows, then, that
the public trust doctrine imposes certain limitations on the Coun-
cil in its regulation of these lands. First, courts require adherence
to various procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the conse-
quences of altering trust property have been considered fully.'
7 5
The second limitation imposed by the public trust doctrine
is a substantive one. Courts will set aside any legislative or ad-
ministrative attempt to transfer public trust property to private
persons for private purposes.'7 8 Such property must be devoted to
public purposes, and public bodies must retain control over the
area.'77 As one authority explains:
Public uses must be preserved; limited encroachments that are
tolerated must be justified as an enhancement of what remains.
170. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972).
171. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 23-24, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 (1972). See
text accompanying notes 204-11 infra.
172. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971).
173. Id.
174. State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 541, 193 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1972); Rice Hope
Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 216 S.C. 500, 530, 59 S.E.2d 132, 145
(1950); Cape Romain Land & Imp. Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428,
438, 146 S.E. 434, 438 (1928) ("The title to land below the high-water mark on tidal
navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is in the state, not for the purpose of sale,
but to be held in trust for public purposes.") See generally Wyche, Tidelands and the
Public Trust: An Application for South Carolina, 7 ECOL. L.Q. 137 (1978). For a discussion
of public rights in lands beyond the mean high-water mark, see Note, 29 S.C.L. REv.
627 (1978).
175. See, e.g., Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 105 N.W.2d 143
(1960) (preparation of findings); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61
N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972) (holding of hearings); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v.
Wildlife Preserves Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966) (consideration of alternatives).
See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 177 (1977).
176. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); County of
Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1973); People ex rel. Scott v.
Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976); International Paper Co. v.
Mississippi Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
Cf. Cape Romain Land & Imp. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E.
434 (1928) (upholding the validity of leases by the State of public trust property).
177. Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 46111. 2d 330, 343-44, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970);
State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 118, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73-74 (1957).
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It is not enough that the invasion be conducted with care and
damage kept to a minimum. The encroachment must be justi-
fied by necessity and perhaps only upon the proffer of an ade-
quate substitute. If there is no substitute for an irreplaceable
resource, the invasion is unacceptable. The pattern that
emerges comes very close to a doctrine that can be described as
no significant deterioration of public rights in public re-
sources.' 8
Unfortunately, the Act contains no explicit recognition that
lands below the mean high-water mark are held in trust for public
purposes. The Council's final rules and regulations, however, re-
flect an awareness of the limitations imposed by the public trust
doctrine on the use of these lands. The Council states that all
applications to fill in wetlands and submerged lands for the pur-
pose of creating commercial and residental lots "strictly for pri-
vate gain" will be denied."9 Moreover, applications for dredge
and fill permits in wetland areas will be considered only if the
activity is water dependent and no feasible alternatives are avail-
able.'80 Finally, the Council notes that "[n]o permit shall be
construed as alienating public property for private use. .. .
The role of a reviewing court should be to ensure that the
Council's actions are consistent not only with its own regulations
but also with the procedural and substantive limitations of the
public trust doctrine as discussed above. When it is determined
that the Council has issued a permit, the effect of which would
178. W. RODGERS, supra note 175, § 2.16 at 82.
179. Rule 30-12(G)(2)(a), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 46 (1978). Regretably, the Coun-
cil has retreated from the position it took in its draft rules and regulations. There it stated
that the "creation of commercial and residential lots for private gain is not a legitimate
justification for the dredging and filling of tidelands. Permits for the dredging and/or
filling of tidelands for these purposes will be denied." Rule 30-9(G)(2)(a), 1 S.C. State
Reg. No. 13 at 63-64 (1977). The regulations for such activities exclude dredging and insert
the adverb "strictly" to modify "private gain." Dredging, however, can be as destructive
of tidal areas as filling and should not be permitted when proposed for private purposes.
Conceivably, the phrase "strictly for private gain" might be relied on by the Council in
allowing the commercial development of a tidal area on the grounds of a claimed benefit
to the public through additional employment and economic improvement. But this type
of argument was expressly rejected in People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill.
2d 65, 73, 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (1976), where the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a
legislative grant of submerged lands to the U.S. Steel Corporation as violative of the
public trust doctrine.
Ideally, the Council should return to its prior position on dredge and fill activities in
tidal areas, as set out in the draft regulations.
180. Rule 30-12(G)(2)(b), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 46 (1978).
181. Rule 30-4(F), id. at 27.
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be to cause "significant deterioration"'' 2 of the jus publicum,'83 a
court should not hesitate to invalidate the permit.
C. The Takings Doctrine
For purposes of illustration, assume that X applies to the
Council for a permit to undertake a development in a critical
area. The Council determines that the application is contrary to
the policies specified in the Act and denies the permit. X begins
suit under section 18 of the Act,' 4 claiming the Council's action
deprives him the "existing practical use" of his property and thus
constitutes a taking of private property in violation of both the
South Carolina' 5 and United States constitutions.' 8 This type of
suit is very likely to arise under the Act.
The basic principle is well understood: just compensation is
required in the case of a taking, but not in the case in which
private loss results from the proper exercise of the police power.'"
Great difficulty arises in attempting to determine in a particular
fact situation whether government has overstepped the line at
which "regulation ends and taking begins."'8 8 In searching for this
line, courts have utilized a wide variety of tests, three of which
appear to be followed most widely.
Foremost among them is "the diminution of value theory"
propounded by Justice Holmes in his famous decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'' Under this theory, the court
asks whether, and to what extent, the owner's ability to earn a
profit from his property has been impaired. If the profit-making
capacity has been severely reduced, a taking is said to have oc-
curred and the owner is constitutionally entitled to just compen-
sation.'o
182. W. RODGERS, supra note 175.
183. A clear example would be the issuance of a permit to a private developer to fill
in a tract of public trust property for the construction of a private resort.
184. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-180 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
185. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13 provides that "private property shall not be taken...
for public use without just compensation being first made therefore."
186. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." This requirement has been held incorporated in the four-
teenth amendment, hence applicable to the states. Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
187. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 365, 175 S.E.2d
391, 394 (1970).
188. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
189. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
190. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151 (1971)
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The second approach involves a balancing analysis, in which
the court weighs the potential public benefit from enforcement of
the regulation against the private loss. A taking occurs when the
latter is found to outweigh the former. 9'
Under the third approach, the noxious uses test, the court
focuses on the nature of the private activity to which the regula-
tion applies. If the activity is deemed to be harmful, noxious, or
the equivalent of a nuisance, private losses sustained in comply-
ing with the measure are noncompensable. 21
Because a high degree of interdependence exists among the
tests,'93 a court may apply all three to the facts'of a given case.
For example, the dimunition of value in the property affected is
relevant in balancing the competing interests. Similarly, the nox-
iousness of the private use is pertinent in determining the public
benefit to be derived from upholding the regulation. Because the
three tests are so flexible and interrelated, courts can easily ma-
nipulate them to reach a desired result. It becomes exceedingly
difficult to construct an analytical framework within which the
taking cases can be evaluated."4 In the final analysis, as Justice
Holmes observed, "the question depends upon the particular
facts."195
For this reason, attorneys confronted with a takings issue
"generally look for precedents involving similar fact situa-
tions.""' 6 Hence, an examination of those cases in which govern-
[hereinafter cited as Sax, Takings].
191. The Supreme Court probably relied on such a test in Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962): "[To evaluate the reasonableness [of the ordi-
nance] we therefore need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which
it will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and
the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance."
192. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (Upholding city ordinance
prohibiting operation of brickyard in city limits even though effect was to reduce the value
of petitioner's property by over 90%).
193. Three other approaches can be discerned in the cases: (1) the invasion theory,
which requires the actual physical appropriation of property (of no relevance today); (2)
the cause of the harm test, discussed in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 46-50 (1964); and (3) the government enterprise rule, which requires compensation
where a landowner is coerced into using his property essentially for governmental pur-
poses, discussed in Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulations, supra note 169, at 888.
A fourth approach is the one adopted in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972). See text accompanying notes 204-11 infra.
194. Professor Sax has observed that "[flew legal problems have proved as resistant
to analytical efforts as that posed by" the takings issue. Sax, Takings, supra note 190, at
149.
195. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922 .
196. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKiNG ISSUE 139 (1973) [hereinafter
696 [Vol. 29
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mental controls on the use of wetlands have been challenged
under the takings doctrine would be helpful. '97 Initially, the
courts were sympathetic to the claims of the private landown-
ers. ' In State v. Johnson,'99 the leading case of this group, the
Maine State Wetlands Control Board denied appellants' applica-
tion for a permit to fill in an area of salt marsh. Relying on the
guiding principle of Pennsylvania Coal,2 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine held that refusal to issue the permit left appel-
lants with "commercially valueless land"2 ' and constituted an
unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Since Johnson, however, a "quiet judicial revolution""2 2 has
been occurring in which the courts generally sustain the applica-
tion of wetland protection laws against challenges based on the
takings doctrine.0 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court sparked the
revolution with its decision in Just v. Marinette County."°4 In that
case, landowners sought a declaratory judgment that the county's
shoreland zoning ordinance, which prohibited the filling of their
property (freshwater wetlands), was unconstitutional. Unlike the
cited as BossELmAN].
197. For more extensive discussions, see BOSSELMAN, supra note 196; The Use of Land:
A Citizens Policy Guide to Urban Growth (W. Reilly ed. 1973); Binder, Taking Versus
Reasonable Regulations: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25
U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1972); Sax, Takings, supra note 190; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1970); Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulations, supra note 169; Comment, The
Wetlands Statutes: Regulation or Takings?, 5 CoNN. L. REv. 64 (1972); Comment, Recent
State Wetlands Cases: The Continuing Battle Over the Proper Scope of Regulation, 6
E.L.R. 10, 125 (1976).
198. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); Dooley
v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n., 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (combined flood
plain zoning and wetlands ordinance); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Com-
missioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965);
Morris County Land Imp. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d
232 (1963). But see, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. &
Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) (upholding prohibition on
deposit of fill in bay).
199. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
200. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
201. 265 A.2d at 716.
202. BOSSELMAN, supra note 196, at 212.
203. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168
Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975);
Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972);
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972); cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1108 (1973) (flood plain zoning ordinance); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Contra, Lemp v. Town Bd. of Islip, 394 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct.
1977). See also MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 344 N.E.2d 185 (Mass. 1976).
204. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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Johnson court, the Just court focused on the adverse effects the
proposed activity would have on environmental quality and the
public interest therein. The court took judicial notice that
swamps and wetlands "serve a vital role in nature, are part of the
balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in
our lakes and streams.""2 5 The landowners desired to undertake
a use of their property that would upset this balance and thereby
injure the public.2"6 Consequently, the ordinance did not exceed
the limits of the police power since its purpose was to restrain
conduct harmful to the public.
The court distinguished its prior decisions awarding compen-
sation as involving excessive restrictions on the natural uses of
the land. The court concluded:
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change
the essential natural character of his land to use it for a purpose
for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures
the rights of others ...[W]e think it is not an unreasonable
exercise of [the police power] to prevent harm to public rights
by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.0 '
The approach adopted in Just differs significantly from the
three tests traditionally applied by other courts. The court
framed the test of compensability in terms of a distinction be-
tween restrictions placed on property to restrain conduct harmful
to the public and those designed to secure a benefit not presently
enjoyed by the public. Only in the latter situation would the state
be compelled to pay compensation. 8 Under this analysis, the
diminution in value of the landowner's property becomes a minor,
if not irrelevant, factor.2 0 Moreover, virtually no balancing test
exists since the court ascribes such great weight to the public
interest in environmental quality.10 In short, if the restriction
205. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767. See also 86 HARv. L. REv. 1582, 1584-85 (1973).
209. The court purported to apply the diminution of value test but refused to take
into account the value of the property in a filled state. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
Nonetheless, "its finding that the filling of wetlands was a harmful use essentially prede-
termined its outcome under that test." 86 HAv. L. Rxv. at 1585.
210. BOSSELMAN, supra note 196, at 264. Balancing tests, heavily weighted in favor of
the public interest in the wetlands, were also applied in Brecciaroli v. Connecticut
Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975), and in Sibson
v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
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prevents a use of property that would result in a certain degree
of harm to the public interest,211 no taking occurs.
The Act itself contains support for the approach taken by the
Just court. Section 18 provides that a taking occurs whenever
"the Council's action so restricts or otherwise affects the use of
the property so as to deprive the owner of its existing practical
use."212 It is submitted that "existing" refers only to those uses
for which the critical area is suited in its natural state, uses such
as swimming, fishing, and hiking. Uses requiring substantial
changes in the natural condition of the property would not be
deemed "existing" within the meaning of section 18. As the court
stated in Just: "It seems to us that filling a swamp not otherwise
commercially usable is not in and of itself an existing use, which
is prevented, but rather is the preparation for some future use
which is not indigenous to a swamp. 21
The term "practical," it is suggested, refers only to those uses
that do not harm the public. While dredging and filling in critical
areas probably do not amount to noxious uses under the tradi-
tional test, these activities nonetheless cause substantial harm to
the public.214 In their natural state, tidelands and coastal waters
provide essential habitat for most commercial and sports fisher-
ies, protect adjacent highlands, and act as filters in absorbing
211. An obvious question under Just is what constitutes a sufficient level of harm to
sustain a restriction on the use of property. The answer lies somewhere between the
minimal effects associated with the construction of a private pier and the noxious effects
of a polluting factory in a residential community. Professor Sax suggests that noncom-
pensable uses are those that "physically restrict a neighbor, burden a common, impose
on the community an affirmative burden of providing public services, or adversely affect
some interest in health or well-being." Sax, Takings, supra note 190, at 163. The indirect
effects of dredging, filling, or substantially altering a critical area certainly would fall
within the categories enumerated by Sax. Such activities burden the estuarine and ocean
waters, a resource common to all, and adversely affect the public interest in environmental
quality.
212. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-180 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If the court finds that a taking
has occurred, it may itself issue the permit to the applicant or direct that just compensa-
tion be paid.
213. 56 Wis. 2d at 22, 201 N.W.2d at 770. See also Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,
129, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (1975): "The board has not denied plaintiffs' current uses of their
marsh but prevented a major change in the marsh that plaintiffs seek to make for specula-
tive profit."
214. In Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 547, 88 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1955),
the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[riegulations and restrictions upon the
manner in which a property owner may use his property when necessary for the general
welfare are properly a part of the police power of legislative bodies and, if reasonable, are
valid in so far as they tend to prevent harm to the public and to promote the public good."
(emphasis added) (quoting 9 Am. JuR. Buildings § 3 (1937)).
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sediment and pollution that emanate from upland areas.2"- The
beaches and sand dunes represent "an extremely dynamic sys-
tem" that maintains shoreline stability and serves as a protective
barrier to inland areas.2 ' When these areas are converted into
foundations for residential and industrial structures, the inevita-
ble result is increased pollution, greater storm and flood damage,
loss of marine life, and reduced recreational opportunities. As the
Council notes with respect to developments on sand dunes: "If
these fragile dunes and their natural shifting sands are unduly
disturbed, upland property can be exposed to direct erosion, the
harmful spray intrusion and the full impact of storm surges.
21 7
A proposed activity that would result in such adverse effects
should be deemed impractical for purposes of section 18. As a
result, private losses sustained by not being permitted to under-
take the activity would be noncompensable.15
When the property in question is located below the mean
high-water mark, reliance on this suggested approach may be
unnecessary. First, the individual claimant would face the almost
insuperable obstacle of proving title to the tract vis-A-vis the
State.2"' Even if such proof were possible, the Council would still
be correct in asserting that the property is subject to the jus
publicum, absent express legislation extinguishing the trust.22
Therefore, in denying a permit application to alter a tidelands
tract, the Council would be merely protecting the paramount
rights of the public in the property. 22
1
Those critical areas located beyond the mean high-water
mark are beyond the traditional purview of the public trust doc-
215. Rule 30-I(A), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 19-21 (1978). See also E. ODUM, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF ECOLOGY, ch. 13 (3d ed. 1971); D. RANWEL, ECOLOGY OF SALT MARSHES AND SAND
DuNEs (1975); Laurie, Salt Marsh: A Question of Survival, 22 S.C. WMDL. MAG., no. 2 at
21(1975).
216. Rule 30.1(B), 2 S.C. State Reg. No. 7 at 21-22 (1978). See also D. RANWEL, supra
note 215.
217. Rule 30-11(B), 1 S.C. State Reg. No. 13 at 76 (1977).
218. One commentator has recommended a similar construction of the North Caro-
lina coastal zone law. Glenn, Coastal Area Management Plan, supra note 168, at 327-38.
219. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
220. See Marks v. Whitney, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971).
221. See Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulations, supra note 169, at 898-99. It
is well settled that the sovereign, in the exercise of the navigation servitude, may take
private property below the mean high-water mark without obligation to compensate there-
fore. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United
States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Early v. South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Auth., 228 S.C. 392, 406-07, 90 S.E.2d 472, 478-79 (1955); Rice Hope Plantation v.
South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 216 S.C. 500, 528, 59 S.E.2d 132, 144 (1950).
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trine. In these cases, the Just approach, which is at least arguably
authorized by section 18, affords a sound basis for determining
whether a taking has occurred. 22
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A decade of debate among legislators, citizens, and environ-
mentalists culminated in passage of the South Carolina Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1977. The Act creates a new State
agency, the Coastal Council, to develop a coastal zone manage-
ment program and to regulate the use of the State's most valuable
natural resources, the coastal waters, tidelands, beaches, and
sand dunes. Today a person wishing to undertake a substantial
activity in any of these critical areas must first obtain a permit
from the Council.
The Act is not without its weaknesses and problems of statu-
tory interpretation. Vast areas of the coastal zone, most signifi-
cantly, those uplands adjacent to the critical areas, are beyond
the Council's jurisdiction. Its scope of authority is probably too
limited to meet the mandates of the CZMA; consequently, the
State may be unable to receive federal funding to implement its
222. The takings cases in South Carolina provide little indication how the supreme
court would approach this issue under the Act. On the one hand, the court has sustained
municipal ordinances requiring permits to construct a filling station, Gasque v. Town of
Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940); to keep cows in the city limits, Ward v. Town
of Darlington, 183 S.C. 263, 190 S.E. 826 (1937); and to operate a livery stable, Douglass
v. City Council of Greenville, 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912). On the other hand, the court
has invalidated ordinances requiring permits to erect billboards within the city limits,
Schloss Poster Advertising Co. v. City of Rock Hill, 190 S.C. 92, 2 S.E.2d 392 (1939), and
to build structures within 200 feet of a railroad crossing, Henderson v. City of Greenwood,
172 S.C. 16, 172 S.E. 689 (1933).
Despite the apparent inconsistency among these cases, it is possible to distinguish the
latter two as involving "interest group favoritism in the formal trappings of community
welfare legislation." Van Alstyne, supra note 197, at 10. In Henderson, the court found
that the sole purpose of the ordinances was to impair, if not destroy, the appellant's
business, 172 S.C. at 25, 172 S.E. at 692, and in Schloss Poster, the ordinance was being
administered "so as to give exclusive profits or privileges to particular persons." 190 S.C.
at 95, 2 S.E.2d at 394. In Gasque, stating that taking ordinarily requires "a positive act
or aggressive step," the court found that the council had committed only "a negative act"
by refusing to grant appellant a permit. 194 S.C. at 23, 8 S.E.2d at 874. Apparently, the
court was relying on the now discredited physical invasion theory. See note 193 supra. In
Douglass and Ward, the court applied the noxious uses test in finding the permit denials
to be reasonable exercises of the police power.
These cases, however, will be of little precedential value in deciding a takings chal-
lenge under the Act. They all involve the application of local ordinances to the use of
properties that clearly lack the statewide significance of the critical areas. In short, there
are no obstacles in the case law to the supreme court's adherence to the Just approach.
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management program. The General Assembly could cure this
deficiency by amending the Act to extend the Council's jurisdic-
tion. Absent such legislation, the Council may be able to broaden
its powers sufficiently through an arrangement with various State
and local agencies that would permit a "networking of author-
ity."
The Act purports to give the courts authority to review de
novo actions taken by the Council. The courts, however, will
likely construe this provision as permitting judicial review only
under the clearly erroneous substantial evidence test. This con-
struction would prevent the court from substituting its own judg-
ment for that of the Council, thereby preserving the viability of
the administrative process established for protecting the State's
critical areas.
The Act also purports to transfer to the State title to all
oceanfront property formed by the process of accretion. Again,
the courts will probably adopt a construction that does not pose
a difficult constitutional issue. In doing this, the courts will retain
the common-law rule with respect to lands accreted by natural
forces prior to passage of the Act; all other accreted property
would pass to the State. All these areas, of course, would remain
subject to the Council's authority.
Under section 2223 of the Act, a party may bring suit against
the State to establish title to lands below the mean high-water
mark. The section does not,, however, alter the well-settled rule
that the State comes into court with a heavy presumption of title
in its favor. While section 22 may lead to an increase in the
number of ownership disputes, the State's title to the tidelands
will probably remain secure.
The principal federal authority in South Carolina's coastal
zone is the Army Corps of Engineers. While the Corps' authority
encompasses areas well beyond the Council's jurisdiction, the
State's tidelands and coastal waters are now subject to the con-
trol of both agencies. In these areas, the Corps will defer to the
State's determination on a permit application unless "overriding
factors of national interest" dictate otherwise. The actions of all
federal agencies in the coastal zone become subject to the terms
of the State's management program once it receives federal ap-
proval.
223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-220 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 29
37
Wyche: The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1977
Published by Scholar Commons, 1978
SOUTH CAROLINA CZMA
The nondelegation and takings doctrines pose constitutional
issues the courts will soon have to face. The former doctrine,
which concerns the Act in its entirety, would stand little, if any,
chance of success; the latter, which concerns specific action taken
by the Council under the Act, presents a more difficult problem.
The question for the court will be whether the Council's refusal
to issue a permit deprives the applicant of the "existing, practical
use" of his property. The court should interpret and apply this
standard in light of the immense value of the State's critical
areas, the alteration of which can cause serious harm to the public
interest in health, safety, and environmental quality. Conse-
quently, when the applicant seeks to undertake a publicly harm-
ful use for which the property is not suited in its natural state,
the Council's denial of the permit would be a proper exercise of
its police powers.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that the
public trust doctrine applies to lands below the mean high-water
mark in this State. This doctrine imposes on the Council the duty
to insure that these lands remain devoted to public purposes and
subject to public control. Therefore, the Council lacks the author-
ity to transfer public trust property to private persons for private
purposes.
The Act is couched in broad language and vests considerable
discretion in the Council. The Council is directed, for example,
to "duly consider" the environment,224 "to balance" economic
interests, 225 and to provide "adequate environmental safe-
guards.'221 While the public trust doctrine and availability of
judicial review clearly impose some limits on the Council's discre-
tion, whether the Act becomes a blank check for development, or
a strong check against it, depends primarily on the predelictions
of the administrators. The Council should strive to preserve and
protect the critical areas of our coastal zone not only for this
generation but also for those to come.
Bradford W. Wyche
224. Id. § 48-39-30(B)(1).
225. Id. § 48-39-20(F).
226. Id. § 48-39-30(B)(1).
1978]
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